BadgeApp

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

No existe un conjunto de prácticas que pueda garantizar que el software nunca tendrá defectos o vulnerabilidades; incluso los métodos formales pueden fallar si las especificaciones o suposiciones son incorrectas. Tampoco existe ningún conjunto de prácticas que pueda garantizar que un proyecto mantenga una comunidad de desarrollo saludable y que funcione bien. Sin embargo, seguir las mejores prácticas puede ayudar a mejorar los resultados de los proyectos. Por ejemplo, algunas prácticas permiten la revisión por parte de múltiples personas antes del lanzamiento, lo que puede ayudar a encontrar vulnerabilidades técnicas que de otro modo serían difíciles de encontrar y ayudar a generar confianza y un deseo repetido de interacción entre desarrolladores de diferentes compañías. Para obtener una insignia, se deben cumplir todos los criterios DEBE y NO DEBE, se deben cumplir, así como todos los criterios DEBERÍAN deben cumplirse o ser justificados, y todos los criterios SUGERIDOS se pueden cumplir o incumplir (queremos que se consideren al menos). Si desea añadir texto como justificación mediante un comentario genérico, en lugar de ser un razonamiento de que la situación es aceptable, comience el bloque de texto con '//' seguido de un espacio. Los comentarios son bienvenidos a través del sitio de GitHub mediante "issues" o "pull requests". También hay una lista de correo electrónico para el tema principal.

Con mucho gusto proporcionaríamos la información en varios idiomas, sin embargo, si hay algún conflicto o inconsistencia entre las traducciones, la versión en inglés es la versión autorizada.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 1 is gold Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/1/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/1)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/1"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/1/badge"></a>


These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • Identification

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    BadgeApp is the web application that allows developers to provide information about their project and (hopefully) get an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Best Practices badge. This project was originally known as the Core Infrastructure Initiative (CII) best practices badge project.

    The Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) is managed by The Linux Foundation. The OpenSSF Best Practices badge online application (aka the BadgeApp) enables developers to quickly determine whether they are following best practices and to receive a badge they can display on GitHub and other locations. The application and its criteria are an open source project to which developers can contribute.

    You can see the program running, and use it to try to get a badge, by visiting: https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/

    The BadgeApp is written in Ruby on Rails and Javascript.

    See the development site on GitHub for more about how we secure this application.

    Note that the BadgeApp gets its own badge!

  • Prerrequisitos


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Supervisión del proyecto


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    We require a DCO for contributions, as documented in https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md which says:

    All contributions (including pull requests) must agree to the [Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO) version 1.1](doc/dco.txt). This is exactly the same one created and used by the Linux kernel developers and posted on http://developercertificate.org/. This is a developer's certification that he or she has the right to submit the patch for inclusion into the project.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    The governance mode of the Badge app is outlined in on our GitHub repository within doc/governance.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    See CODE_OF_CONDUCT.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    The document doc/governance.md describes the key roles, which are basically "technical lead" and "others with commit rights". It also identifies who has those roles.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    This project is run by the Linux Foundation, a 501(c)6. Multiple people are authorized to do all these activities (create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software), including David A. Wheeler, Jason Dossett, Marcus Streets, Nicko van Someren, and Dan Kohn. See [CREDITS])(https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge/blob/master/CREDITS.md). The Linux Foundation could authorize others, if needed. Thus, the project can continue even if any one person is incapacitated or killed.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    David A. Wheeler, Jason Dossett, and Dan Kohn are all very familiar with the software and could easily continue its maintenance if necessary. Many other people have contributed per CREDITS and several of them could also probably maintain it if absolutely necessary. See GitHub contributors statistics for the latest statistics on contributors.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    The project roadmap explains these things. Note that the project is in sustainment, so we're focusing more on continuous smaller improvements instead of massive changes.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    The design is documented in doc/implementation.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    The security requirements and assurance case are documented in doc/security.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    The doc/INSTALL.md installation manual also includes "quick start" information to help someone get started. In particular, it describes how to start up the program, access it via a web browser, become an administrator, and access its internal state to perform a few tasks.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    We routinely update the documentation when a new capability is added.

    For example, when the software was modified on 2017-05-27 to support a separate runtime configuration environment variable to set the database pool size (originally commit 8eef5e77ec5b08bc6714e2aa5a6139e71e55ff2b), by the next day (2017-05-28) in commit 1a8bcb5c5b40751ca874bd0b550f25a6aa8d7ea5 the documentation was modified to record it.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    We record on our homepage that we have a CII best practices badge, good code coverage, and that we use CircleCI as our continuous integration (CI) system.


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    We generally follow accessibility best practices, e.g., we provide ALT values for images where relevant.

    We use this website to find accessibility problems: https://achecker.ca/checker/index.php We've checked the following paths (these are key forms in the system): "/", "/signup", "/login", "/projects", and "/projects/1". There are no known problems and no likely problems.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    The software is internationalized using standard Ruby on Rails mechanisms. This data is then sent on to the JavaScript code where appropriate. We use translation.io to manage the translations.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    We use GitHub, who meet this criterion.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Versiones anteriores


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    Normally only a single version of the product is in production use. That said, it's important to handle upgrades, especially so that various developers can upgrade. How to upgrade is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md.

    Here is a summary of common cases: * Upgrading often involves a database migration, which is handled by running "rake db:migration" (if the user forgets to do this, it is detected, running stops, and this information is presented). * Other upgrades generally involve installing updated gems (libraries), which are handled with "bundle update". * In rare cases an update to the Ruby language is needed; the steps to do this are also in CONTRIBUTING.md.


 Informes 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    Yes, GitHub issue tracker.


  • Proceso de informe de vulnerabilidad


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    We've never had an external bug reporter.

    CONTRIBUTING.md notes that:

    We will gladly give credit to anyone who reports a vulnerability so that we can fix it. If you want to remain anonymous or pseudonymous instead, please let us know that; we will gladly respect your wishes.

    This is emphasized in the vulnerability report handling process doc/security.md, where the last step is giving credit.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    The vulnerability report handling process is documented in doc/security.md.


 Calidad 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents our coding style guides.

    As documented there: * For Ruby on Rails, we generally follow the community Ruby style guide and the complementary community Rails style guide. * For JavaScript, our coding style is based on the Node.js style guide.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents our coding style enforcement mechanisms.

    As documented there: * For Ruby on Rails, we use rubocop and rails_best_practices for style enforcement (as well as Brakeman to find vulnerabilities) * For JavaScript, we ESLint.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    The application does not create native binaries. (Some of the libraries it depends on do, but those are external.)


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    The application does not create native binaries. (Some of the libraries it depends on do, but those are external.)


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    The application does not create native binaries. (Some of the libraries it depends on do, but those are external.)


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    The application does not create native binaries. (Some of the libraries it depends on do, but those are external.) It is written in scripting languages where the source code is used directly.


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    We include an install script, install_badge_dev_env which allows devs to quickly install the software for development. This script uses calls to various package managers to install all necessary dependencies quickly and easily. The uninstall process is documented in doc/INSTALL.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    There is no installation system for build artifacts, as it's written using scripts.

    It could be said that Rails builds web application assets (e.g., minified and concatenated JavaScript, and combined CSS); under that interpretation, they are written by the Rails framework as part of the execution of the Rails asset pipeline, and this is controlled in the usual way by controlling the framework.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    The software is installed using standard conventions for this kind of software. The underlying Ruby libraries are installed using bundler (the usual Ruby package manager). Lower-level system components are normally installed using the system package manager.

    It's possible to install these quickly, using a provided installation shell script that determines which system package manager to use & tries to automatically install whatever is needed, including the tests and test environment. The instructions for quickly installing everything is in INSTALL.md.


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    External dependencies are stored in a Gemfile.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    External dependency checking is performed in two ways:

    • bundle_audit. This checks all gems for known vulnerabilities. This is run on every execution of the "rake" local check task and on every run of the continuous integration task on CircleCI.
    • Gemnasium. This also checks gems for known vulnerabilities, and puts the current status on a badge that is displayed on the front page of the project home page.

    For the few external dependencies that aren't managed as gems (e.g., PostgreSQL) the system package managers and/or the deployment system's managers are used to maintain them & periodically check them.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libaries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    The project uses bundler, the standard package management solution for Ruby, for most externally-maintained components. For the rest (e.g., PostgreSQL) it uses the system package manager.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    We avoid depending on deprecated/obsolete functions.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    We use CircleCI to automatically test every check in to any branch in our repository. I some circumstances experimental branches which do not yet run even in a development environment may be ignored via a custom entry in our circle.yml file. The master, staging, and production branches are always tested.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    When regressions occur, we add tests for them.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    As of this writing, we have 100% statement coverage, see Codecov.io.


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    Yes, this is a documented policy in CONTRIBUTING.md which says:

    When adding or changing functionality, please include new tests for them as part of your contribution.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    Yes. The CONTRIBUTING file at https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md says, "When adding or changing functionality, please include new tests for them as part of your contribution".


  • Banderas de advertencia


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The settings for the warning tools are generally fairly strict.


 Seguridad 13/13 ●

  • Conocimiento de desarrollo seguro


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    They are implemented, as described in doc/security.md.


  • Use buenas prácticas criptográficas

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    The only cryptography used directly by this application is bcrypt (used for storing passwords as salted iterated hashes). At the time of this writing, no serious breaks are known in bcrypt. The application also depends on the web server's https configuration, but that is out of scope for this code.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    This implements a web application, and the (external) web server determines what cryptographic algorithms are in use by the user. If the web server supports multiple cryptographic algorithms (and it usually would), then the application does. The functionality that calls out to other systems (e.g., OAUTH for GitHub, and data access for the detectives) are also external (and they support multiple algorithms anyway).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    All authentication credentials can be provided via environment variables when run in production, so no useful key is stored in the source code.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    Github uses TLS 1.2, see https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    The software does not directly implement TLS, instead, it depends on the webserver and Ruby libraries to implement TLS - including certificate checking. That said, there is a case where TLS certificate verification is necessary.

    The only case where TLS certificate verification matters is that this application uses OAuth for access delegation (in this case, we contact GitHub to determine if someone is the claimed GitHub user). In this case it does need to verify the TLS certificate, because if anyone could pretend to be the access delagatee (e.g., GitHub) then they could claim anything. The application does not do this directly, instead this is done by the gems (Ruby libraries) we call for this purpose, which perform this checking.

    Other than that, this application does not use TLS certificate verification. That's because it implements a server-side application, not a client-side application, and uses name/password or GitHub authentication for user authentication (not TLS certificates).


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    The software does not directly implement TLS, instead, it depends on the webserver and Ruby libraries to implement TLS - including certificate checking. That said, there is a case where TLS certificate verification is necessary, and this is supported (indirectly) by the systems it depends on.

    The only case where TLS certificate verification matters is that this application uses OAuth for access delegation (in this case, we contact GitHub to determine if someone is the claimed GitHub user). In this case it does need to verify the TLS certificate, because if anyone could pretend to be the access delagatee (e.g., GitHub) then they could claim anything. The application does not do this directly, instead this is done by the gems (Ruby libraries) we call for this purpose, which perform this checking.

    Other than that, this application does not use TLS certificate verification. That's because it implements a server-side application, not a client-side application, and uses name/password or GitHub authentication for user authentication (not TLS certificates).


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    Releases are not intended for widespread use in many different sites, so this is N/A.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    In production the software is run in a single site, so the need for signed versions is less.


  • Otros problemas de seguridad


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    All inputs from potentially untrusted sources are checked & rejected if they are invalid. Some, such as justifications, only have a few limitations (must be UTF-8 and have a limited length). For more information, see security.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    We use various HTTP headers for hardening, including a rigorous Content Security Policy (CSP) setting. For more information, see security.md which discusses the hardening mechanisms.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    The security requirements and assurance case are documented in doc/security.md.


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Análisis estático de código


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    Brakeman specifically looks for common vulnerabilities in Ruby on Rails applications.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    Application written using Ruby and Javascript, not C/C++



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit David A. Wheeler and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: David A. Wheeler.
Entry created on 2015-10-23 22:02:10 UTC, last updated on 2023-12-04 16:17:48 UTC. Last lost passing badge on 2023-09-19 06:10:11 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2023-09-19 06:10:30 UTC.

Back