BadgeApp

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 1 is gold Here is how to embed it:

These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 17/17

  • Identification

    BadgeApp is the web application that allows developers to provide information about their project and (hopefully) get an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Best Practices badge. This project was originally known as the Core Infrastructure Initiative (CII) best practices badge project.

    The Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) is managed by The Linux Foundation. The OpenSSF Best Practices badge online application (aka the BadgeApp) enables developers to quickly determine whether they are following best practices and to receive a badge they can display on GitHub and other locations. The application and its criteria are an open source project to which developers can contribute.

    You can see the program running, and use it to try to get a badge, by visiting: https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/

    The BadgeApp is written in Ruby on Rails and Javascript.

    See the development site on GitHub for more about how we secure this application.

    Note that the BadgeApp gets its own badge!

  • Prerrequisitos


    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]
  • Supervisión del proyecto


    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]

    We require a DCO for contributions, as documented in https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md which says:

    All contributions (including pull requests) must agree to the [Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO) version 1.1](docs/dco.txt). This is exactly the same one created and used by the Linux kernel developers and posted on http://developercertificate.org/. This is a developer's certification that he or she has the right to submit the patch for inclusion into the project.



    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]

    The governance mode of the Badge app is outlined in on our GitHub repository within docs/governance.md



    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]

    The document docs/governance.md describes the key roles, which are basically "technical lead" and "others with commit rights". It also identifies who has those roles.



    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    This project is run by the Linux Foundation, a 501(c)6. Multiple people are authorized to do all these activities (create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software), including David A. Wheeler, Jason Dossett, Marcus Streets, Nicko van Someren, and Dan Kohn. See [CREDITS])(https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge/blob/master/CREDITS.md). The Linux Foundation could authorize others, if needed. Thus, the project can continue even if any one person is incapacitated or killed.



    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]

    David A. Wheeler, Jason Dossett, and Dan Kohn are all very familiar with the software and could easily continue its maintenance if necessary. Many other people have contributed per CREDITS and several of them could also probably maintain it if absolutely necessary. See GitHub contributors statistics for the latest statistics on contributors.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]

    The project roadmap explains these things. Note that the project is in sustainment, so we're focusing more on continuous smaller improvements instead of massive changes.



    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]

    The design is documented in docs/implementation.md



    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]

    The security requirements and assurance case are documented in docs/security.md.



    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]

    The docs/INSTALL.md installation manual also includes "quick start" information to help someone get started. In particular, it describes how to start up the program, access it via a web browser, become an administrator, and access its internal state to perform a few tasks.



    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]

    We routinely update the documentation when a new capability is added.

    For example, when the software was modified on 2017-05-27 to support a separate runtime configuration environment variable to set the database pool size (originally commit 8eef5e77ec5b08bc6714e2aa5a6139e71e55ff2b), by the next day (2017-05-28) in commit 1a8bcb5c5b40751ca874bd0b550f25a6aa8d7ea5 the documentation was modified to record it.



    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]

    We record on our homepage that we have a CII best practices badge, good code coverage, and that we use CircleCI as our continuous integration (CI) system.


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]

    We generally follow accessibility best practices, e.g., we provide ALT values for images where relevant.

    We use this website to find accessibility problems: https://achecker.ca/checker/index.php We've checked the following paths (these are key forms in the system): "/", "/signup", "/login", "/projects", and "/projects/1". There are no known problems and no likely problems.



    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]

    The software is internationalized using standard Ruby on Rails mechanisms. This data is then sent on to the JavaScript code where appropriate. We use translation.io to manage the translations.


  • Other


    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
  • Versiones anteriores


    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    Normally only a single version of the product is in production use. That said, it's important to handle upgrades, especially so that various developers can upgrade. How to upgrade is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md.

    Here is a summary of common cases: * Upgrading often involves a database migration, which is handled by running "rake db:migration" (if the user forgets to do this, it is detected, running stops, and this information is presented). * Other upgrades generally involve installing updated gems (libraries), which are handled with "bundle update". * In rare cases an update to the Ruby language is needed; the steps to do this are also in CONTRIBUTING.md.


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    Yes, GitHub issue tracker.


  • Proceso de informe de vulnerabilidad


    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    We've never had an external bug reporter.

    CONTRIBUTING.md notes that:

    We will gladly give credit to anyone who reports a vulnerability so that we can fix it. If you want to remain anonymous or pseudonymous instead, please let us know that; we will gladly respect your wishes.

    This is emphasized in the vulnerability report handling process docs/security.md, where the last step is giving credit.



    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]

    The vulnerability report handling process is documented in docs/security.md.


  • Coding standards


    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents our coding style guides.

    As documented there: * For Ruby on Rails, we generally follow the community Ruby style guide and the complementary community Rails style guide. * For JavaScript, our coding style is based on the Node.js style guide.



    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents our coding style enforcement mechanisms.

    As documented there: * For Ruby on Rails, we use rubocop and rails_best_practices for style enforcement (as well as Brakeman to find vulnerabilities) * For JavaScript, we ESLint.


  • Working build system


    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]

    The application does not create native binaries. (Some of the libraries it depends on do, but those are external.)



    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]

    The application does not create native binaries. (Some of the libraries it depends on do, but those are external.)



    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]

    The application does not create native binaries. (Some of the libraries it depends on do, but those are external.)



    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]

    The application does not create native binaries. (Some of the libraries it depends on do, but those are external.) It is written in scripting languages where the source code is used directly.


  • Installation system


    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]

    We include an install script, install_badge_dev_env which allows devs to quickly install the software for development. This script uses calls to various package managers to install all necessary dependencies quickly and easily. The uninstall process is documented in docs/INSTALL.md.



    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    There is no installation system for build artifacts, as it's written using scripts.

    It could be said that Rails builds web application assets (e.g., minified and concatenated JavaScript, and combined CSS); under that interpretation, they are written by the Rails framework as part of the execution of the Rails asset pipeline, and this is controlled in the usual way by controlling the framework.



    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]

    The software is installed using standard conventions for this kind of software. The underlying Ruby libraries are installed using bundler (the usual Ruby package manager). Lower-level system components are normally installed using the system package manager.

    It's possible to install these quickly, using a provided installation shell script that determines which system package manager to use & tries to automatically install whatever is needed, including the tests and test environment. The instructions for quickly installing everything is in INSTALL.md.


  • Externally-maintained components


    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]

    External dependencies are stored in a Gemfile.



    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]

    External dependency checking is performed in two ways:

    • bundle_audit. This checks all gems for known vulnerabilities. This is run on every execution of the "rake" local check task and on every run of the continuous integration task on CircleCI.
    • Gemnasium. This also checks gems for known vulnerabilities, and puts the current status on a badge that is displayed on the front page of the project home page.

    For the few external dependencies that aren't managed as gems (e.g., PostgreSQL) the system package managers and/or the deployment system's managers are used to maintain them & periodically check them.



    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]

    The project uses bundler, the standard package management solution for Ruby, for most externally-maintained components. For the rest (e.g., PostgreSQL) it uses the system package manager.



    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    We avoid depending on deprecated/obsolete functions.


  • Automated test suite


    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]

    We use CircleCI to automatically test every check in to any branch in our repository. I some circumstances experimental branches which do not yet run even in a development environment may be ignored via a custom entry in our circle.yml file. The master, staging, and production branches are always tested.



    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    When regressions occur, we add tests for them.



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]

    As of this writing, we have 100% statement coverage, see Codecov.io.


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    Yes, this is a documented policy in CONTRIBUTING.md which says:

    When adding or changing functionality, please include new tests for them as part of your contribution.



    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]

    Yes. The CONTRIBUTING file at https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md says, "When adding or changing functionality, please include new tests for them as part of your contribution".


  • Banderas de advertencia


    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    The settings for the warning tools are generally fairly strict.


  • Conocimiento de desarrollo seguro


    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]

    They are implemented, as described in docs/security.md.


  • Use buenas prácticas criptográficas

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    The only cryptography used directly by this application is bcrypt (used for storing passwords as salted iterated hashes). At the time of this writing, no serious breaks are known in bcrypt. The application also depends on the web server's https configuration, but that is out of scope for this code.



    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    This implements a web application, and the (external) web server determines what cryptographic algorithms are in use by the user. If the web server supports multiple cryptographic algorithms (and it usually would), then the application does. The functionality that calls out to other systems (e.g., OAUTH for GitHub, and data access for the detectives) are also external (and they support multiple algorithms anyway).



    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    All authentication credentials can be provided via environment variables when run in production, so no useful key is stored in the source code.



    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]

    The software does not directly implement TLS, instead, it depends on the webserver and Ruby libraries to implement TLS - including certificate checking. That said, there is a case where TLS certificate verification is necessary.

    The only case where TLS certificate verification matters is that this application uses OAuth for access delegation (in this case, we contact GitHub to determine if someone is the claimed GitHub user). In this case it does need to verify the TLS certificate, because if anyone could pretend to be the access delagatee (e.g., GitHub) then they could claim anything. The application does not do this directly, instead this is done by the gems (Ruby libraries) we call for this purpose, which perform this checking.

    Other than that, this application does not use TLS certificate verification. That's because it implements a server-side application, not a client-side application, and uses name/password or GitHub authentication for user authentication (not TLS certificates).



    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    The software does not directly implement TLS, instead, it depends on the webserver and Ruby libraries to implement TLS - including certificate checking. That said, there is a case where TLS certificate verification is necessary, and this is supported (indirectly) by the systems it depends on.

    The only case where TLS certificate verification matters is that this application uses OAuth for access delegation (in this case, we contact GitHub to determine if someone is the claimed GitHub user). In this case it does need to verify the TLS certificate, because if anyone could pretend to be the access delagatee (e.g., GitHub) then they could claim anything. The application does not do this directly, instead this is done by the gems (Ruby libraries) we call for this purpose, which perform this checking.

    Other than that, this application does not use TLS certificate verification. That's because it implements a server-side application, not a client-side application, and uses name/password or GitHub authentication for user authentication (not TLS certificates).


  • Secure release


    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]

    Releases are not intended for widespread use in many different sites, so this is N/A.



    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    In production the software is run in a single site, so the need for signed versions is less.


  • Otros problemas de seguridad


    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]

    All inputs from potentially untrusted sources are checked & rejected if they are invalid. Some, such as justifications, only have a few limitations (must be UTF-8 and have a limited length). For more information, see security.md.



    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]

    We use various HTTP headers for hardening, including a rigorous Content Security Policy (CSP) setting. For more information, see security.md which discusses the hardening mechanisms.



    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]

    The security requirements and assurance case are documented in docs/security.md.


  • Análisis estático de código


    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    Brakeman specifically looks for common vulnerabilities in Ruby on Rails applications.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    Application written using Ruby and Javascript, not C/C++



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit David A. Wheeler and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: David A. Wheeler.
Entry created on 2015-10-23 22:02:10 UTC, last updated on 2025-01-03 20:27:50 UTC. Last lost passing badge on 2023-09-19 06:10:11 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2023-09-19 06:10:30 UTC.

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