GnuPG

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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    GnuPG is a complete and free implementation of the OpenPGP standard as defined by RFC4880. GnuPG allows to encrypt and sign your data and communication, features a versatile key management system as well as access modules for all kinds of public key directories. GnuPG, also known as GPG, is a command line tool with features for easy integration with other applications.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Patches shall be send to the gnupg-devel mailing list. To allow us to apply them the author needs to send a DCO. See https://gnupg.org/documentation/bts.html



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    File doc/HACKING and its online version at https://gnupg.org/faq/HACKING.html


  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    Most code is under the GPL-3.0+, some code under LGPL-2.0+ OR GPL-2.0+, some sub projects use LGPL-2.1+. Distributed copyright is used, and there are no proprietary exceptions.



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]


    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    File COPYING in the top directory. Link to the the license (https://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html) from the 2nd paragraph of https://gnupg.org.index.html


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    man page for all tools and info document. PDF version and HTML version of the Info file online.


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    All web our web sites provide https access. Only https based links are used to refer to GnuPG pages.



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    Several archived mailing lists; see https://lists.gnupg.org https://wiki.gnupg.org https://bugs.gnupg.org Public XMPP channel for use by developers (gnugp-devel at conference dot jabber. gnupg.org ).



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    Aside from a few language specific mailing lists and translated documentaion English is the primary language for the project.



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git https://git.gnupg.org



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Git is used along with a server which has write access for the core developers. See above. Some commiters are signing commits. Release tags have always been signed since the siwtch to git. Release tarballs are signed. Commit logs have in addition GNU ChangeLog style entries.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Commits are done daily or more often. Several release branches exist. Developers have there own namespace on the public server.



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    git


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    Major.minor.micro style. Two or three branches are maintained (currently 1.4, 2.0. 2.1)



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    We use signed tags named after the version number.


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    NEWS file in the tarball and the announcement. Example: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=NEWS



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    CVE number is added to the NEWS entry and also as CVE-id in commit logs. Example [CVE-2014-4617].


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]


    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]


    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]


    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    The bug tracker is piblic and has a search feature. https://bugs.gnupg.org


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    Description at https://bugs.gnupg.org/documentation/security.html . The AUTHORS file in the tarball starts with a list of URLs including a mail address for security bugs.



    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    Description at https://bugs.gnupg.org . We do not have a shared encryption key for the core developers but ask the reporter to request required keys via the security mail address.



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    Standard GNU configure && make system on Unix. For Windows an automated cross-build system is part of the release. For the latter this includes the download of all required dependecies.



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    C compiler, make, standard Unix tools.



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    No proprietary tools are required at all.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]


    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]


    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Due to extensive error handling we won't be able to reach that goal easily. The test suite is currently changed to allow the creation of a testing suite for running that on Windows too (Windows binaries are cross-build) .



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    A Jenkins instance is running on one machine. We are planning to make the results public available.


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    We have an informal policy that all non trivial new code needs to have an associated test.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]


    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]


    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    On our main development platforms (Debian) we try to fix all warnings for a release if possible. The Windows port has warnings but they have all been evaluated to be non-serious.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    Newer gcc versions may introduce warnings which we can's fix immediately. On Windows we keep the warnings as reminder for a future port to 64 bit Windows.


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]


    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]


    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    GnuPG is all about cryptography.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]


    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    Note that the current OpenPGP protocol requires the use of 160 bit SHA-1 for fingerprints, which we obviously must implement. We sometimes also need to implement weaker algorithms to allow the decruption of old data. approriate warnings are shown.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    GnuPG 2.1 has removed support for PGP-2 keys which relied on MD5. Other branches still support MD5 with a warning.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    SHA-1, as used for OpenPGP fingerprints, has no known weaknesses in that use case (collision attacks are not a threat here).



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    PFS for offline protocols like OpenPGP is not possible in a practical usable way



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    Using the S2K salted+interated methods as specified by OpenPGP.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    The FTP server is also available under a HTTPS address. All tarballs are signed by at least one core developers, the signing keys are widely distributed. SHA-1 checksums are given in announcements. https://versions.gnupg.org/swdb.lst{,sig} is a signed file with version information including SHA-256 checksums. That file can be used for automated builds.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]


    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    We run clang static analyzer on our Jenkins.



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]


    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]


    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    We don't run them ourself but rely on contributors who do that regulary; in particular using AFL. There is no requirement in the release process, though. However, major releases take place only every couple of years and the current code base has by then been analyzed.



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    We use valgrind to test all new features.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    The C files in GnuPG alone have about 770 call to assert and many other explicit checks for unexpected conditions.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]


This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 license (CC-BY-3.0) per the terms of use. All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Werner Koch and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Werner Koch.
Entry created on 2016-06-09 11:35:33 UTC, last updated on 2016-08-11 20:49:32 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2016-06-10 14:25:00 UTC.

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