Adélie Linux

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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • Identification

    Adélie Linux is a Free, Libre operating environment based on the Linux kernel. We aim for standards compliance, compatibility with a wide variety of computers, and ease of use without sacrificing features, setting us apart from other Linux distributions.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    https://www.adelielinux.org/


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    https://www.adelielinux.org/contribute.html


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/packages/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.rst - pull requests or send via mailing list, both described in detail.


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/packages/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.rst links to the Developer's Handbook at https://help.adelielinux.org/html/devel/ which describes packaging in detail.


  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The package recipes themselves are NCSA. We only allow libre software to be packaged; if it isn't on SPDX, it isn't accepted. The NCSA license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    Many of the MIT derivatives are not OSI-approved, and there are a few licenses that are uncommon but used by packages that remain libre. The NCSA license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/packages/blob/master/LICENSE


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    https://help.adelielinux.org/


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    The packaging format itself is included with abuild as https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/abuild/blob/master/APKBUILD.5 - all packages that have this documentation are built with it included in -doc packages.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    Issue tracker: https://bts.adelielinux.org/ Mailing lists: https://lists.adelielinux.org/postorius/lists/


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    All of our documentation is in English, and all of our bug wranglers can read English.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Packages, base files, and all other relevant software is all tracked in a publicly-accessible, hosted GitLab instance: https://code.foxkit.us/groups/adelie


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Git does this.


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Every package change is tracked in a separate commit, except batch changes (like typo correction, changing HTTP URLs to HTTPS, etc).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Git is used.


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    Detailed information about our release process is forthcoming; we plan on using SemVer-style versioning.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    All releases are tagged in their respective repositories. The packages.git repository is tagged with the overall distribution version (1.0-beta2, for example).


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    Release notes are provided for every release on our blog, https://adelie.blog/ - these are additionally posted to our main Web site.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Issues may be reported using the issue tracker at https://bts.adelielinux.org/ or the mailing lists at https://lists.adelielinux.org/postorius/lists/


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    https://bts.adelielinux.org/


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Approximately 80% of bugs have been triaged.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    Most enhancement requests have been requests for packages; most reasonable requests are handled within two weeks.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    Both our issue tracker and mailing lists would qualify: https://bts.adelielinux.org/ and https://lists.adelielinux.org/postorius/lists/


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    Security-sensitive issues are discussed at https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/packages/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.rst


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    The sec-bugs email alias as discussed at https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/packages/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.rst is for private vulnerability reports.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    We have not received any.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    The abuild system is used to build packages and is available as the 'abuild' package in the distribution, or https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/abuild


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    The abuild system is written in Bourne shell, with a replacement forthcoming that is written in pure Python 3.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    abuild is released under the MIT and GPL-2 licenses: https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/abuild


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    abuild has its own test suite: https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/abuild/tree/master/tests

    Each package that we ship that has a test suite as part of its distribution has that test suite run as part of the packaging process. If the test suite fails, we are alerted and must fix the issue before the package can be shipped. In some cases, test suites fail due to upstream issues: this is noted with options="!check" in the build recipe. A reason is required.


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    make check for abuild, abuild check for packages (also run as part of the normal abuild process).


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    // More tests need to be written.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    // This is still in progress.


  • New functionality testing


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    // This is being looked in to, but has not been fully implemented yet.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    // No test policy exists yet.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    // No test policy exists yet.


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    sh -e is used: https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/abuild/blob/master/abuild.in#L1 checkbashisms is also being used.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    We are integrating changes that remove dependence on bash-specific features.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    The Project Lead, A. Wilcox, is familiar with security best practices and has worked to close multiple CVEs in other projects, including packages that are shipped in Adélie Linux.


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    abuild uses SHA-512 for checksumming and openssl for package signing.


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    abuild uses openssl and sha512sum; it does NOT implement its own cryptography.


    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    All cryptography libraries and software used are fully libre.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    The default key size for package signing is RSA 2048: https://code.foxkit.us/adelie/abuild/blob/efc6792/abuild-keygen.in#L53


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    RSA 2048 keys for package signing, SHA-512 for checksumming.


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    SHA-512 is used for checksumming.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    Packages are synced to mirrors using rsync over SSH. Each architecture builder has its own SSH key that can be revoked in the event of a breach..


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    Package metadata is always verified with RSA 2048 signature verification. Additionally, package metadata is sent over HTTPS by default. If the user forces HTTP, the signature verification step is still performed. (It is possible, though severely warned against, to defeat this using apk's --allow-untrusted parameter.)


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    As far as we are aware, there are no unpatched vulnerabilities in any of our produced projects. We do not yet have a way to determine that for every package we ship.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    The last critical vulnerability was fixed in under 12 hours after being reported. https://adelie.blog/2018/09/14/urgent-security-patch-for-all-systems-running-adelie-linux/


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

  • Static code analysis


    Not enough for a badge.

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    We are looking in to Coverity for the C packages that we are responsible for (Shimmy, abuild tools). This has not materialised yet.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    No static analysis tools are used yet.


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    No static analysis tools are used yet.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    No static analysis tools are used yet.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    // We have not yet looked in to dynamic analysis tools for our C-based projects.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    // As above, we have not yet looked in to dynamic analysis tools for our C-based projects.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    // As above, we have not yet looked in to dynamic analysis tools for our C-based projects.


    Not enough for a badge.

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    // As above, we have not yet looked in to dynamic analysis tools for our C-based projects.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit A. Wilcox and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: A. Wilcox.
Entry created on 2019-04-19 00:46:38 UTC, last updated on 2019-04-19 01:52:59 UTC.

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