OWASP Threat Dragon

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 9266 is passing Here is how to embed it:

These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    Threat Dagon is an open source threat modeling tool and is one of the official OWASP projects. It is used to draw threat modeling diagrams and to list threats for elements in the diagram along with their remediations.

    Threat Dragon is primarily a web application which can store threat model files on the local filesystem. In addition access can be configured for access to GitHub, Bitbucket, GitLab and Github Enterprise. The desktop versions of Threat Dragon stores the threat model files on the local filesystem only, with installers for Windows, MacOS and Linux.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project documentation website provides the description: https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/#div-description as well as the project website: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/README.md



    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/contributing.md.



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    The code of conduct details acceptable behavior: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/code_of_conduct.md and there is also a page on how to contribute along with the CoC: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/contributing.md


  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/license.txt.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    The project has a separate documentation repository: https://github.com/OWASP/www-project-threat-dragon This provides user documentation, along woth details on how to test it as a developer, for both version 1.x: https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/docs-1/ and version 2.x: https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/docs-2/



    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    There is dociumentation on how to get started: https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/docs-2/getting-started/ Along with other topics such as installation and so on : https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/docs-2/install-webapp/


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs.



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests and these are used by Threat Dragon: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/discussions https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/issues



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    Bug reports and comments / enhancements are entered as github issues, which can be entered in English: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/issues



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]

    The project received its 3000th commit on Jul 29, 2024 : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/commits/main/



(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



This is an active official OWASP project that has OWASP Laboratory status. The first commit to the original threat dragon repository was made on 9th October 2015 and has been in continual development since then.

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git, is here: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made. Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    The git tags are used to provide interim releases, for example: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/tags?after=v2.0.5 Sometimes the releases are just released, but sometimes they go through iterations before release after review



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git, is here: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon git is common distributed version control software Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    The project uses semantic versioning and the released versions are here: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/releases with the latest version 2.2.0 given here: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/releases/tag/v2.2.0



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Here are the tags for each release: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/tags Note that releases before version 1.3 were from a different (private) repo before it transferred over to the official OWASP repo


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    They are not released as separate files, but are added to the release area itself in the description for each release as text tailored for the individual release, for example: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/releases/tag/v2.2.0



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    So far no publicly known vulnerabilities or even publicly unknown ones ;) The one advisory published did not need a CVE: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/security/advisories/GHSA-6r5p-cg7w-2rrv


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Both GitHub issue tracker: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/issues and also via direct contact with the project leaders: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon?tab=readme-ov-file#contributing



    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    Yes, GitHub issue tracker provides this : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/issues



    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Bug reports all have a comment acknowledging the report, except for some of the ones raised by the project leader (Jon Gadsden): https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3Abug and the closed bugs mostly have comments: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/issues?q=is%3Aissue+label%3Abug+is%3Aclosed



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    The enhancement requests have all been responded to, except for some of the ones raised by the project leader (Jon Gadsden) : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3Aenhancement



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    Yes, via GitHub isue tracker : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    Vulnerability reporting process is detailed here and uses the GitHub security vulnerability reporting process: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/security.md



    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    This is supported using GitHub security vulnerability reporting process: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/security/advisories/new



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    The one vulnerability report received was on Nov 16, 2023 and was fixed by Nov 29, 2023 : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/security/advisories/GHSA-6r5p-cg7w-2rrv


  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    The software is written using Javascript, and the implementation runs directly from the source code using Node.js . The docker images are built and published automatically using a github workflow on merge to the main branch: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/.github/workflows/push.yaml there are various github workflows that build Threat Dragon on push, release, pull-request and nightly



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    Threat Dragon is a Vue/Node.js application and is built using npm (Node.js Package Manager) and Electron (desktop system for Node.js applications). Both of these are common tools used by the FLOSS community



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    The Threat Dragon is a Node.js application and uses 100% FLOSS packages sourced from the npm package registry


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    The Threat Dragon back end is based on the Express web server and has a set of unit tests using the mocha test framework, with the CLI provided by nyc The application is written using the Vue framework and has unit tests using jest with the CLI provided by vue-cli-service Functional testing of the application is provided by Cypress test framework



    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    Both the funtional testsand the unit tests for both the application and the back end are invoked using scripts contained in the Node.js package.json file, which is the standard way to run tests for a Node.js application, just type 'npm test' There is a documentation page on the unit tests: https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/docs-2/unit/ and on the functional end-to-end tests: https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/docs-2/e2e/



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    The code coverage for both applications and back-end are displayed at the end of the unit tests, run using standard Node.js command npm test



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    there are various github workflows that build Threat Dragon on push, release, pull-request and nightly : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/tree/main/.github/workflows


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    this policy is in the contributing instructions at : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/contributing.md#ground-rules



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    latest features are required to have unit tests and functional tests, for example a recent pull request : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/pull/1239/files



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    the pull request template has documented instructions on contributing which are inorporated in every pull request using the template: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/.github/pull_request_template.md


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    The Vue Javascript linter, vue-cli-service lint, is run as a pretest before running the unit tests. If this fails then the unit tests will not run. the unit tests are part of the pipelines run on pull-request and commit to main branch, and the pipelines will fail if the unit tests / linter throws errors



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    warning are reported when running unit tests and functional tests. These are reported to the console so that they can be addressed during code development



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    The project leader for Threat Dragon, Jon Gadsden, is the main contributor to the OWASP Developer Guide. The demonstrates a good depth of knowledge on secure coding and secure software development lifecycles: https://owasp.org/www-project-developer-guide/release/



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    Jon Gadsden, the project leader for Threat Dragon, is a software security engineer in a product security team and is familiar with erros that lead to software vulnerabilities. In addition he has an ISC2 CSSLP qualification that demonstrates this


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    The software uses https and standard crypto protocols to communicate with both users and with code repositories



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    No crypto functions are re-implemented by Threat Dragon



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    Threat Dragon only uses FLOSS, for crypto and other functionality



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    while smaller key lengths are not disabled, it is suggested i the documentation that the symmetric keys are have a key length of 128 bits using: openssl rand -hex 16



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    Threat Dragon uses OAuth for its identity and access management to the repository



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    No cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses are used



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    this is provided by the crypto in the standard libraries used by Threat Dragon in addition nothing in the code inhibits or prevents the use of PFS; that is a property of the website's web server.



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    The software does not store passwords for authentication of external users



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

    cryptographic keys and nonces are generated using npm modules such as the one providing the Content Security Policy


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    Threat Dragon uses https



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    http is not used by Threat Dragon unless it is in a non-production environment


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    Any vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity are reported by dependabot and are fixed easily within 60 days : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Aclosed+label%3Aautomation



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    Any critical vulnerabilities are reported by dependabot and are fixed rapidly : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Aclosed+label%3Aautomation


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

    No valid private credentials are leaked. There is a .env file, but it only includes stub data for testing, not the live credentials


  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    CodeQL static code analysis is applied on pull-request, on commit to main branch and also in the nightly pipelines



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    CodeQL static code analysis include rules to look for common vulnerabilities in Javascript



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    If CodeQL detects medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities then this stage of the pipeline will fail, requiring that hey be fixed before the pipeline can pass



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    CodeQL static code analysis is applied in the nightly pipelines, as well as on pull-request and on commit to main branch


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    Threat Dragon is analysed by OWASP ZAP on pull-request and also on commits to the main branch, using github workflow pipelines : https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/actions



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    Application written using Javascript, with no C/C++ source or any other memory-unsafe language used within the project



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    No assertions are embedded in the Treat Dragon code, as this is not a generally used feature of Javascript



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    Any issues found via OWASP ZAP have been fixed, with some rules put on an ignore list because they are not relevant: https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon/blob/main/.github/workflows/.zap-rules-web.tsv



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Jon Gadsden and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Jon Gadsden.
Entry created on 2024-07-29 19:20:57 UTC, last updated on 2025-03-08 22:18:07 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2025-03-08 22:18:07 UTC.

Back