universe

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

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These are the

level criteria. You can also view the

level criteria.

Analysis 2/2 ●

Dynamic code analysis

Criterion [dynamic_analysis]
Met

Unmet

N/A

?

The project MUST apply at least one dynamic analysis tool to any proposed major production release of the software produced by the project before its release. ^{[dynamic_analysis]}
A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

We use our own DAST tool, which is executed on every CI pipeline on development and production branches.

Criterion [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
Met

Unmet

N/A

?

The project SHOULD include many run-time assertions in the software it produces and check those assertions during dynamic analysis. ^{[dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]}
This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

We add assertions everywhere it should be done.

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universe

Basics 5/5 ●

Identification

Prerrequisitos

Supervisión del proyecto

Other

Change Control 4/4 ●

Repositorio público para el control de versiones de código fuente

Calidad 7/7 ●

Coding standards

Working build system

Automated test suite

Seguridad 5/5 ●

Use buenas prácticas criptográficas

Entrega garantizada contra ataques de hombre en el medio (MITM)

Otros problemas de seguridad

Analysis 2/2 ●

Dynamic code analysis