Heimdal

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 Basics 7/13 ●

  • Identification

    Heimdal is an implementation of Kerberos 5 (and some more stuff) largely written in Sweden (which was important when we started writing it, less so now). It is freely available under a three clause BSD style license.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?

  • Basic project website content


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Projects on GitHub by default use issues and pull requests, as encouraged by documentation such as https://guides.github.com/activities/contributing-to-open-source/.


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The BSD-3-Clause license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The BSD-3-Clause license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/blob/master/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    Some documentation basics file contents found.


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

  • Other


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given an http: URL. // Given an http: URL.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    Heimdal uses a three component version number scheme major.major.patch

    Git Tags including the version number are committed for each release.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Git Tags including the version number are committed for each release.


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/blob/master/ChangeLog.

    https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/releases


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/releases

    http://www.h5l.org/advisories.html


  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    GitHub issues

    https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Issues submitted via https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues are triaged at least once a month but are often responded to within 48 hours


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    Via e-mail using a public PGP key

    https://www.h5l.org/ documents the process.


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    Public PGP key

    Warning: URL required, but no URL found.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    Heimdal Kerberos is a dependency of Samba, Apple macOS, Apple iOS, Apple tvOS, Apple ipadOS, One Idenitty and more.

    The project maintainers have an extensive history of managing coordinated multi-vendor security releases.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    http://www.h5l.org/compile.html

    Continuous integration via Travis and Appveyor builds every submitted patch.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    http://www.h5l.org/compile.html


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    On Linux and Solaris this is true.

    Builds with Apple XCode for Apple platforms and Microsoft Visual Studio for Windows


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    Test suite is integrated with the build system.


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    make check


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    https://api.travis-ci.org/v3/job/543033748/log.txt


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    Travis (Linux and macOS) and Appveyor (Windows)


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    ommit 4b2c3ea03277a42ff7d424e634213d15913229e2 Author: Luke Howard lukeh@padl.com Date: Tue May 21 15:18:16 2019 +1000

    kuser: allow kinit to renew anonymous PKINIT tickets

Anonymous PKINIT tickets discard the realm information used to locate the
issuing AS. Store the issuing realm in the credentials cache in order to locate
a KDC which can renew them.

(cherry picked from commit d89b5cb966c41015fad524027107dd2d241b44e8)

    commit 9793551bb919d0dc6b41d9d6b80356f44d82ac9e Author: Isaac Boukris iboukris@gmail.com Date: Mon Nov 12 20:08:06 2018 +0200

    kdc: allow checksum of PA-FOR-USER to be HMAC_MD5

even if tgt used an enctype with a different checksum.

Per [MS-SFU] 2.2.1 PA-FOR-USER the checksum is always
HMAC_MD5, and that's what Windows and MIT clients send.

In heimdal both the client and kdc use instead the
checksum of the tgt, and therefore work with each other
but windows and MIT clients fail against heimdal KDC.

Both Windows and MIT KDC would allow any keyed checksum
to be used so Heimdal client work fine against it.

Change Heimdal KDC to allow HMAC_MD5 even for non RC4
based tgt in order to support per-spec clients.

Back ported from master, commit:
b7fe0fb85a780fed3c54ed2539fc974db1884dc2

Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    ommit 4b2c3ea03277a42ff7d424e634213d15913229e2 Author: Luke Howard lukeh@padl.com Date: Tue May 21 15:18:16 2019 +1000

    kuser: allow kinit to renew anonymous PKINIT tickets

Anonymous PKINIT tickets discard the realm information used to locate the
issuing AS. Store the issuing realm in the credentials cache in order to locate
a KDC which can renew them.

(cherry picked from commit d89b5cb966c41015fad524027107dd2d241b44e8)

    commit 9793551bb919d0dc6b41d9d6b80356f44d82ac9e Author: Isaac Boukris iboukris@gmail.com Date: Mon Nov 12 20:08:06 2018 +0200

    kdc: allow checksum of PA-FOR-USER to be HMAC_MD5

even if tgt used an enctype with a different checksum.

Per [MS-SFU] 2.2.1 PA-FOR-USER the checksum is always
HMAC_MD5, and that's what Windows and MIT clients send.

In heimdal both the client and kdc use instead the
checksum of the tgt, and therefore work with each other
but windows and MIT clients fail against heimdal KDC.

Both Windows and MIT KDC would allow any keyed checksum
to be used so Heimdal client work fine against it.

Change Heimdal KDC to allow HMAC_MD5 even for non RC4
based tgt in order to support per-spec clients.

Back ported from master, commit:
b7fe0fb85a780fed3c54ed2539fc974db1884dc2

Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>

    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    The project leadership each has more than 20 years developing secure software.


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    The project implements IETF standardized security protocols which were in many cases developed with input from members of the project development team.


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    Heimdal provides a cryptographic framework that provides its own implementations and can leverage the operating system provided cryptographic implementations, PKCS#11, and OpenSSL.


    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    open source implementations of all algorithms are provided as a backstop.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    weak ciphers are implemented for interoperability as required.


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    weak ciphers are implemented for interoperability as required.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    as permitted by the protocols


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    The Kerberos KDC and Kerberos keytabs store keys following industry best practice


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

    operating system and hardware random sources are leveraged whenever possible


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    Source tarballs for releases are signed with a PGP key and delivered via GitHub https


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    SHA1 and SHA256 hashes of the PGP signed tarball are provided via https


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    Coverity


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    Coverity


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    daily build of master branch


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]


This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Jeffrey Altman and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Jeffrey Altman.
Entry created on 2016-07-22 03:59:19 UTC, last updated on 2019-06-08 03:57:26 UTC.

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