Crypto++

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 3806 is passing Here is how to embed it:

These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    Free C++ class library of cryptographic schemes

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    "Free C++ class library of cryptographic schemes", https://cryptopp.com



    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Projects on GitHub by default use issues and pull requests, as encouraged by documentation such as https://guides.github.com/activities/contributing-to-open-source/.



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]
  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    Public Domain or Boost Software License v1 (BSL-1.0), https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/master/License.txt.



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    Public Domain or Boost Software License v1 (BSL-1.0), https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/master/License.txt.



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    Link to Manual on homepage, https://www.cryptopp.com/docs/ref/. Link to wiki with code examples on homepage, https://www.cryptopp.com/wiki/.



    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    Link to Manual on homepage, https://www.cryptopp.com/docs/ref/.


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs.



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests. We also have traditional mailing lists at https://www.cryptopp.com/#lists.



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    Link to Manual on homepage, https://www.cryptopp.com/docs/ref/. Link to wiki with code examples on homepage, https://www.cryptopp.com/wiki/.



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



Crypto++ is one of the oldest projects on the web. It was started by Wei Dai in 1992 and the first public release was 1994. Crypto++ was one of the targets of RSA Data Security Inc (RSA DSI) takedowns due to use of RSA while it was still patented. In June 2015 Wei Dai turned the library over to the community for maintenance.

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Crypto++ does not use dead-end branches. It pollutes the Git log history. Instead testing forks are used and proposals are discussed.



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]
  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    The README is the primary human readable document. https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/master/Readme.txt. Each release has its own HTML page. For example, https://github.com/weidai11/website.



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    Each release has its own HTML page that highlights CVEs and major problems that were corrected. For example, from https://github.com/weidai11/website/blob/master/release565.html: "Crypto++ 5.6.5 was released on October 11, 2016. The 5.6.5 release was mostly a maintenance release. The release included two CVE fixes." Then, the CVE details are provided.


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Typically the projects response time is less than a day. https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues.



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    Typically the projects response time is less than a day. https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues.



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    GitHub allows searching of past and closed reports. https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues.


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    We do not support private vulnerabilities. As soon as we get a private report we forward it to the mailing list at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/cryptopp-users.



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    Typically the projects response time is less than a day.


  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/master/GNUmakefile. The project also supplies Autotools https://github.com/noloader/cryptopp-autotools, CMake https://github.com/noloader/cryptopp-cmake and Visual Studio project files for those who wish to use them.



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/master/GNUmakefile. The project also supplies Autotools, CMake and Visual Studio project files for those who wish to use them.



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    The project only requires GNU Make. CD into the project directory and run 'make -j 4'. It really is as easy as that. The project also supplies Autotools, CMake and Visual Studio project files for those who wish to use them.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    'make test' and 'make check' work for me. It follows the GNU Coding Standards.



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Our test suite is comprised of about 13 source files and covers about 80% of the library.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]
  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    Crypto++ is a library of cryptographic schemes. Our governance requires test coverage for new algorithms and protocols. At minimum, a new algorithm will include Known Answer Tests (KATs). Public Key algorithms will include Pairwise Consistency Tests.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    Crypto++ is a library of cryptographic schemes. Our governance requires test coverage for new algorithms and protocols. At minimum, a new algorithm will include Known Answer Tests (KATs). Public Key algorithms will include Pairwise Consistency Tests.



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    Our governance requires new algorithms have both documentation on the wiki and test cases. We don't add new algorithms without test cases. It is too dangerous.

    It looks like we need to add a wiki page on this topic. I thought we had one, but I cannot find it.


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    Testing includes -Wall -Wextra with GCC and Clang. On Windows, testing include /W4. We also have a test script from hell that builds the project in 50-100 permutations (depending on the platform and features available). The tests from hell include 6 different builds to tease warnings. Also see https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/master/TestScripts/cryptest.sh.



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    Our governance requires us to clear warnings under reasonable flags. To date our "reasonable flags" includes -Wall -Wextra. Otherwise, we get mailing list messages and bug reports for them.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    Testing includes -Werror when using GCC and Clang.


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    The development team includes one Security Architect from US Financial and US DoD. The other maintainers have CVs that includes years of cryptography and security experience.

    The library has also been FIPS 140-2 validated by the US government. The FIPS 140-2 validation includes a SP800-56a audit for processes and procedures.



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    The development team includes includes members of OWASP. The other maintainers have CVs that includes years of cryptography and security experience.

    The library has also been FIPS 140-2 validated by the US government. The FIPS 140-2 validation includes a SP800-56a audit for processes and procedures.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    The library includes well known algorithms, like AES; and lesser known algorithms, like RC6, MARS and Twofish.



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    The project is a cryptographic library.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    The project is a cryptographic library.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    When available, the project implements 256-bits of security and above. 256-bits of security exceeds the US government's recommendations on key sizes. Also see https://www.cryptopp.com/wiki/Security_Level.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    The project is a cryptographic library. The project includes weak and wounded ciphers for historical reasons and research purposes.

    However, to use a weak or wounded cipher, a user must build the library with -DCRYPTOPP_ENABLE_NAMESPACE_WEAK. The setting is off-by-default. Then, a user can use a weak or wounded cipher within the Weak:: namespace. I.e., Weak::MD2, Weak::MD5, etc.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    When available, the project uses 128-bits of security by default. 128-bits of security is the US government's recommendation nowadays.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    The project includes ephemeral key exchanges, like DHE and ECDHE.



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    The library itself does not store secrets, like private keys, shared secrets or passwords. Users may build applications that do so, but the library does not.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

    The library includes approved software generators like NIST DBRG from SP800-90. The library also includes hardware-based PRNGS, like Padlock, RDRAND, RDSEED and DARN. DARN is the RDRAND equivalent on PowerPC.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    The project signs its release; see https://www.cryptopp.com/wiki/Release_Signing. The project also uses a trusted distribution channel for downloads using TLS and a Let's Encrypt certificate.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    The project's signing algorithm for release tarballs is SHA-256.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    The project typically responds to bugs within one day. Some patches take longer, but the patches are made available as soon as it is ready (i.e., passes testing).



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    The project typically responds to bugs within one day. Some patches take longer, but the patches are made available as soon as it is ready (i.e., passes testing).


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

    The library does not publish private keys, shared secrets or passwords. Or not that we know of.


  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    The project uses Coverity Scan on Linux and OS X. The project uses Visual Studio Enterprise Analysis on Windows. Finally, the project uses the Looks Good To Me continuous security analysis. Also see https://www.cryptopp.com/wiki/Coverity_Scan and https://lgtm.com.



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    The project uses Coverity Scan on Linux and OS X. The project uses Visual Studio Enterprise Analysis on Windows. Finally, the project uses the Looks Good To Me continuous security analysis. Also see https://www.cryptopp.com/wiki/Coverity_Scan and https://lgtm.com.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    The project typically responds to analysis findings within a hour when run manually, or within a day when reported by a user.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Source code analysis is limited to weekly testing due to limits Synopsis places on the free Security Scan service. I.e., the project is only allowed 12 scans a week. We need to save the extra scans for reproducers and retesting.

    Looks Good To Me continuous security analysis is unlimited, but it is not as good as Coverity.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    The project uses Valgrind and Sanitizers to test for runtime violations. Valgrind detects memory and thread problems. Santiziers include Asan, Msan and UBsan.

    The projects self tests also "fuzz" certain interfaces attempting to crash the test suite. The fuzzing occurs under Valgrind, Asan and Msan.



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    The project uses Valgrind and Sanitizers to test for runtime violations. Valgrind detects memory and thread problems. Santiziers include Asan, Msan and UBsan.

    The projects self tests also "fuzz" certain interfaces attempting to crash the test suite. The fuzzing occurs under Valgrind, Asan and Msan.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    Debug builds of the project includes asserts to aide the developer in finding mistakes.

    Release builds are built with -DNDEBUG and will NEVER asset. The library will validate the parameters and/or state and throw an exception on failure. Anywhere there is an 'if' statement to validate state includes an assert. Anywhere there is an assert to validate state includes an 'if' statement that throws. They are matched set like bookends.

    The Crypto++ library never asserts in production for five reasons. First, it is the application's authors decision to crash their app. The library does not make policy decisions for the application author.

    Second, some platforms, like Apple iOS, forbid applications from crashing because it degrades the UI experience. In this case, the App Store has set the policy for the application author. The library will not cause an author's app to be rejected from an App Store.

    Third, the library handles sensitive information like private keys, shared secrets and passwords. When an assert fires a core file could be written that includes the sensitive information. That means the sensitive information has been egressed outside the application's security boundary. Folks with access to the mobile device, desktop computer or a computer paired/sync'd with the mobile device will be able to recover the secrets from the filesystem.

    Fourth, the core file, if present, may be shipped to an Error Reporting Service. Now Apple, Google, Fedora, Red Hat, Ubuntu or Microsoft have the user's private keys, shared secrets and passwords. Then the information is then passed onto the developer who has the user's private keys, shared secrets and passwords, too.

    Fifth, asserts destroy most of Confidentiality-Availability-Integrity (CIA). When an assert crashes a program, it (1) may preserve data Integrity at the expense of (2) Confidentiality of the data and (3) Availability of the program or server. If an author wishes to preserve Integrity, he/she/it merely needs to return false in the offending function or call exit(1) without the loss of Confidentiality or Availability.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    The project typically responds to analysis findings within a hour when run manually, or within a day when reported by a user.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Jeffrey Walton and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Jeffrey Walton.
Entry created on 2020-03-25 18:25:43 UTC, last updated on 2020-03-26 03:01:39 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2020-03-25 19:57:57 UTC.

Back