cert-manager

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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    Automatically provision and manage TLS certificates in Kubernetes

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    cert-manager is a powerful and extensible X.509 certificate controller for Kubernetes and OpenShift workloads. It will obtain certificates from a variety of Issuers, both popular public Issuers as well as private Issuers, and ensure the certificates are valid and up-to-date, and will attempt to renew certificates at a configured time before expiry.

    From https://cert-manager.io/



    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md.



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]
  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/blob/master/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    We provide extensive documentation for the project on https://cert-manager.io/docs/



    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    The external interface could be considered to be writing CRDs, which are all documented on the website: https://cert-manager.io/docs/reference/api-docs/

    We also provide plugin integration points for power users, which are documented too:

    External issuers: https://cert-manager.io/docs/contributing/external-issuers/ DNS Webhook plugins: https://cert-manager.io/docs/configuration/acme/dns01/webhook/


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs. (We're a TLS certificate management project, we'd consider it a major bug if we didn't support HTTPS!)



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests. We also have a mailing list (https://groups.google.com/g/cert-manager-dev) and slack (although that's proprietary, it's widely used)



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    https://cert-manager.io/ is entirely in English and that's the language we work in daily.



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]

    We have a list of active core maintainers: https://github.com/cert-manager/community/blob/main/MAINTAINERS.md We also have several community members who regularly help with triaging / reviewing. These are members of the cert-manager github org.



(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Before a final release, we publish alpha and beta versions for community review, with well defined meanings for both (beta differs in that it has a feature freeze except for bug fixes).

    Our releases page has examples: https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/releases



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    We use semver for all releases. Each release has a corresponding branch, such that that minor version can be patched independently of any other release.



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Every release has a corresponding git tag.


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    Each release of cert-manager has hand written release notes along with a summary of changes. For example, see the release notes for v1.13.0: https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/releases/tag/v1.13.0

    We also publish release notes on the website: https://cert-manager.io/docs/releases/



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    There have been no CVEs reported for cert-manager. If any were reported, we would definitely prominently display it in all applicable release notes. As a general policy we seek to document every bug fix in the release in which it was fixed.


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    I don't have any specific data to back this up, but we try to at least acknowledge any bug report we get. Often these aren't actually bugs. We have a separate policy for security bugs, where we have a separate mailing list and we'll response within days to any valid report (see https://github.com/cert-manager/community/blob/f04069b6e874bbbd0ae15dd057f44329eb2022a9/SECURITY.md)



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    Again, no data to back it up but I believe we do this. Most requests which meet our criteria will be acknowledged and discussed, often in our daily standups or biweekly meetings (see https://cert-manager.io/docs/contributing/#meetings)



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    Searchable on https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/issues (and on google groups for the mailing list)


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    https://github.com/cert-manager/community/blob/main/SECURITY.md

    Details that people should use email for contacting us, using Google Groups so TLS should be enabled. We don't mention PGP support because it's generally ineffective, but we would gladly discuss alternative channels if needed (such as Signal).



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    For reports which match our criteria, we aim to reply within days and we document this on https://github.com/cert-manager/community/blob/main/SECURITY.md


  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/blob/master/Makefile.

    Anybody can build any release from the makefile, and the makefile is used for all releases we perform as well. The build system is non-trivial, but is open source.



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    Make, go and some other dependencies. All are FLOSS. The makefile has the ability to download and "vendor" dependencies so each dependency version is tracked in each git commit.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    All methods of running tests are defined in the Makefile. Our automated tests apply on PRs and periodically, and are defined using prow.

    As an example of our tests, see: https://github.com/cert-manager/testing/blob/master/config/jobs/cert-manager/cert-manager/master/cert-manager-master.yaml

    An example of a test being run can be seen on any PR, e.g. https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/pull/6495

    An example test run from that PR: https://prow.build-infra.jetstack.net/view/gs/jetstack-logs/pr-logs/pull/cert-manager_cert-manager/6495/pull-cert-manager-master-e2e-v1-28/1725480560475770880



    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    We support go test for unit tests, and all tests are runnable via the Makefile



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    We don't have any specific metrics on this, but our end-to-end tests are extensive and aim to test all relevant issuers and methods of creating certificates



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    All PRs are tested by prow, and then re-tested if merging them requires a rebase (i.e. if the target branch changed after the PR was raised). We have periodic tests which run regularly. Each supported release (currently 1.13 and 1.12) has similar tests for changes and periodic regular tests.


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    All PRs are tested in an automated way before being merged.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    As general policy we require tests to be added for important features. A recent example would be this community member's PR: https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/pull/6486/files

    It adds tests for the feature, which is quite small in scope in this case. If the PR were larger we'd likely also require more testing.



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    I'm surprised to find out we don't seem to explicitly write this out anywhere, although in practice any reviewer would demand that tests are written for non-trivial changes. I'll take this as an action to go and add some docs around testing - although, as I said, we certainly do require that tests are written.


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    We use go vet by virtue of running go tooling, and we have other tooling to check our code / distributable artifacts, including our own tooling to ensure that our go module state is synced.

    All code is has formatting checks too.



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    We generally treat warnings as errors when we see them. The nature of Go development means that often warnings would be fixed locally before new code gets merged.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    I believe in our tooling we generally have warnings enabled as strictly as possible. We'd like to expand our use of linting tools, and when we do we'd aim to be as strict as is reasonable.


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    Many of the primary developers work for security companies where secure software development is the default.

    The developer writing this application has a background in PKI / TLS / security and is a primary developer.



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    We regularly check the OWASP top 10 and the kubernetes equivalent.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    We use the go standard library where possible, which is generally an excellent cryptographic library maintained by experts.

    NB: As a general rule, since cert-manager is a project centred around the handling of cryptographic material, we are exceptionally cautious when it comes to cryptography and we have experts within the team who ensure that we support good cryptography.



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    We use external libraries for our cryptography and would avoid "rolling our own". Mostly, we use the Go standard library.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    The go standard library is FLOSS



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    cert-mangager will not create RSA keys below 2048 bits. Our "minimum" curves are P-256 and Ed25519. We use sha256 as a minimum hash where possible.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    Our only support for these broken algorithms would be in parsing legacy certificates which use these algorithms. Our ability to do that is delegated to the go standard library. We'd be highly critical of any attempt to use any broken algorithm in any context.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    We avoid SHA-1 as a general rule.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    The go standard library supports PFS in TLS, and cert-manager uses TLS where possible, at a minimum of TLS 1.2



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    We don't support passwords for authentication of external users. Where we use the concept of a password it relates to things like PKCS#12 passwords, which tend to be more analagous to shared secrets.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

    We use the cryptographically secure RNG from the go standard library


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    TLS everywhere possible, including when talking to the Kubernetes API which forms the basis of most of our work



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    Where we check hashes (e.g. for provisioning vendored tooling) we generally embed the hashes into code. When they're fetched by a developer they'll be fetched over HTTPS. Before the hashes are added to code, the reviewer should generally check that the hashes match their expectations.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    We run regular scans using trivy and we seek to fix any major vulnerability as soon as possible. The vast majority of reports are false positives but we err on the side of caution if there's any chance that a report is applicable.



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    Any applicable critical vuln would be handled as a matter of urgency.


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

    We sometimes have embedded private keys in our code for testing purposes, but these are always for testing only. All other credentials which we use and which might be committed anywhere are encrypted.


  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    We use go vet since we use standard go tooling. We'd like to expand this in the future.



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    We'd like to implement govulncheck soon for this purpose. We do have this kind of scanning today through trivy.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    We'd fix any vulnerability of any non-trivial severity as a matter of extreme urgency if we suspected it might be exploitable. We regularly issue patch releases including fixes to any reported vulnerability even if we doubt it's exploitable.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    go vet is run on every PR and is run periodically. Trivy scans are run regularly.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    We use Go, and we avoid any use of "unsafe" where possible.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    We use go's race detection in some tests, and we have hte option to enable pprof for testing at runtime. I don't know if we meet this definition as stated, but I believe we meet the spirit of this in some ways.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    We'd treat this like any other vuln - anything exploitable would be fixed as a matter of urgency.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Ashley Davis and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Ashley Davis.
Entry created on 2023-11-17 11:41:16 UTC, last updated on 2023-11-17 12:42:02 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2023-11-17 12:42:02 UTC.

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