Metal3 (Metal Kubed)

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 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    The Metal3 Project's mission is to empower organizations with a flexible, open-source solution for bare metal provisioning that combines the benefits of bare metal performance with the ease of use and automation provided by Kubernetes.

    There are a number of great open source tools for bare metal host provisioning, including Ironic. Metal3 aims to build on these technologies to provide a Kubernetes native API for managing bare metal hosts via a provisioning stack that is also running on Kubernetes. We believe that Kubernetes Native Infrastructure, or managing your infrastructure just like your applications, is a powerful next step in the evolution of infrastructure management.

    The Metal3 project is also building integration with the Kubernetes cluster-api project, allowing Metal3 to be used as an infrastructure backend for Machine objects from the Cluster API. These components integrate seamlessly to leverage the Kubernetes ecosystem and automate the provisioning and management of bare-metal infrastructure.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    Per project repository CONTRIBUTING.md, for example CAPM3: https://github.com/metal3-io/cluster-api-provider-metal3/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    Apache 2.0 https://github.com/metal3-io/community/blob/main/LICENSE The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs.



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    We are available on Kubernetes slack in the #cluster-api-baremetal channel Join to the Metal3-dev google group for the edit access to the Community meetings Notes Subscribe to the Metal3 Development Mailing List for the project related anouncements, discussions and questions. Come and meet us in our weekly community meetings on every Wednesday at 14:00 UTC on Zoom If you missed the previous community meeting, you can still find the notes here and recordings here Find more information about Metal3 on Metal3 Website

    https://github.com/metal3-io/community/blob/main/README.md



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    Everything is in English.



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]

    https://github.com/metal3-io/community/blob/main/maintainers/ALL-OWNERS

    We have 16 active maintainers across the repo right now.



(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    We have 16 active repositories under https://github.com/metal3-io



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    We enforce use of Github Pull Requests for all changes.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    All changes are available in Github.



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Github is used.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    We use semantic versioning, see supported versions: https://book.metal3.io/version_support



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Releases are created from Git tags.


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    Curated changelogs are generated from included PRs. Example: CAPM3 https://github.com/metal3-io/cluster-api-provider-metal3/releases/tag/v1.7.0



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    We request CVEs for vulnerabilities and publish them in release notes. Example: Ironic-image https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/releases/tag/v24.1.1


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    We use GH issues for bug reports and feature requests, with appropriate templates for each. Example: CAPM3 issues https://github.com/metal3-io/cluster-api-provider-metal3/issues



    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    We use GH issues for bug reports and feature requests.



    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    All incoming issues are triaged every two weeks in community meeting at latest, often discussed before that as well.



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    All incoming issues are triaged every two weeks in community meeting at latest, often discussed before that as well.



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]
  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    We have security policy in every repo and in website: https://book.metal3.io/security_policy



    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    The disclosures are sent to private security team mailing list for review. https://book.metal3.io/security_policy



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    All vulnerability disclosures have been answered within 14 days, usually the next working day at the latest.


  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    We have makefiles for building the software, which usually is Go binaries inserted into Docker images. This makefile is then utilized by CI and release processes alike, across Jenkins and GH workflows. Example: CAPM3 https://github.com/metal3-io/cluster-api-provider-metal3/blob/main/Makefile



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    Make and Docker/Podman are the key tools.



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    All tools used are FLOSS. Our development environment is building host and node on top of vanilla Ubuntu and Centos images, and our Dockerimages are mainly based on official Golang Docker images.

    https://github.com/metal3-io/metal3-dev-env


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    Our test suite contains repository level tests and Metal3 level e2e tests via development environment: https://github.com/metal3-io/metal3-dev-env



    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Our test suite contains repository level tests from spellchecks to shellchecks to unit tests to Metal3 e2e tests.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    We use k8s Prow for managing CI, which consists of all levels of tests as requirement to merging changes. Prow, GH workflows and e2e in Jenkins, with various level of testing (integration, real hardware, features, etc)

    https://prow.apps.test.metal3.io/


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    This is agreed and enforced by reviewers, but it is not written down. It will be fixed in future.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    Major functionality has its own suites even, and all PRs are required to be passing e2e suite.



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    We will be adding this to written documentation in addition to verbal documentation in future.


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    We use golangci-lint, yamllint, markdownlint, shellcheck, dead link checkers etc linters as needed per repository and per language.



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    PR cannot be merged if linter complaints, so all warnings are either fixed or marked as false positives.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    We have most of the linters set to maximum strictness, and only line by line disable as necessary. The disabled checks are not common and were working on getting rid of each of them.


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    We have dedicated Security Lead (tuminoid).



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    We have dedicated Security Lead (tuminoid).


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    We are using standard cryptographic libraries and algorithms from the Go and Python ecosystems and as supported by the included FLOSS dependencies, and harden them by configuration to the best practices as applicable. Example: CAPM3 detects if user tries to use insecure TLS ciphers: https://github.com/metal3-io/cluster-api-provider-metal3/blob/ab5731dafddd999f7f3ac42051573228d6c8a4ec/main.go#L509



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    We do not roll our own crypto.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    We are using only FLOSS.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    We are using at minimum SHA256 with exception of MD5 as deprecated, to-be-removed hash, and RSA 2048 bits.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    We have deprecated support for MD5 for image checksums, that is to be removed soon after deprecation period passes.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    No such algorithm is used.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    We are using TLS 1.3 by default (TLS 1.2 can be allowed only via configuration flag) and utilizing the hardened PFS protocols where possible.



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    Passwords in Metal3 Ironic are Bcrypted for internal component communication. Users do not have usernames or passwords.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

    We only generate passwords and keys in CI, in production users supply the keys.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    HTTPS is enabled by default everywhere.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    We download all dependencies via https, and pin them with actual binary hashes or sha1sums downloaded via https.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    There are no publicly or privately known vulnerablities open.



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No critical vulnerabilities have been reported to the project, and if vulnerability is external via dependencies, they are fixed immediately by bots or by security team, and patch release is coordinated shortly after.


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

    We do not have private keys or non-generated passwords in the repositories. We will implement code secrets scanning in future, in addition to Github doing code secrets scanning automatically for us.


  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    golangci-lint is used for all go, shellcheck for all Bash, etc.



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    golangci-lint is configured with gosec and other security linter modules.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    All vulnerabilities are fixed in timely way after being found, regardless of the source of the finding. No PR that has vulnerability will be merged.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    All applicable linters and static code analysis tools run on each PR and must pass before merging is allowed.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    No fuzzing is implemented yet.



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    Only Go and Python are used, which both are memory safe.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    No assertions are enabled in production builds. Gold check for dynamic analysis missing.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    No fuzzing is implemented yet, but all vulnerabilities are fixed in timely way after being found, regardless of the source of the finding. No PR that has vulnerability will be merged.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Tuomo Tanskanen and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Tuomo Tanskanen.
Entry created on 2024-06-26 08:53:13 UTC, last updated on 2024-06-26 12:51:11 UTC. Last lost passing badge on 2024-06-26 12:50:58 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2024-06-26 12:51:11 UTC.

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