systemd

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 1369 is passing Here is how to embed it:

These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 15/17 ●

  • Identification

    systemd System and Service Manager

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md https://raw.githubusercontent.com/systemd/systemd/master/CODING_STYLE


  • Project oversight


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]

    The code is provided under LGPL, so anybody who extends the code can only do it under the terms which allow anybody else to use their work. Any completely new files must include a license header. Either way, code contributions are implicitly


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]

    https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/docs/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    There are multiple "owners" on github (https://github.com/orgs/systemd/people), each of which has pretty much full set of rights. We also use freedesktop.org, with multiple accounts there, and do not control any domains or keys directly.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]

    There are multiple "owners" on github (https://github.com/orgs/systemd/people), each of which has pretty much full set of rights. We also use freedesktop.org, with multiple accounts there, and do not control any domains or keys directly.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]

    https://github.com/systemd/systemd/milestones milestones for the next release(s) are tracked on Github, with bugs, features, etc listed therein


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]

    http://0pointer.de/blog/projects/systemd.html, https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.html#Concepts


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]

    The security policy is published on Github: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/security/policy


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]

    https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/#thesystemdforadministratorsblogseries


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]

    Documentation is (mostly) included directly in the git repository, and all changes to code are accompanied by changes to the documentation. Inaccuracies in documentation are tracked together with other bugs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]

    A badge is included (https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/7256).


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]

    All interfaces are in text / CLI form, so at least in principle it is possible to interact with systemd software using a text reader. Nevertheless, I doubt that a text reader would work during very early boot, and debugging issues in such an environment is an important part of working with systemd. For other components, active in a running system, this is not an issue. In summary, working on most of systemd code-base using assistive technologies is possible, except for some subset because of the constraints of the environment rather than anything that we do.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]

    So top-level messages and output are internationalized, but a large part of the low-level messages are not. Those are not intended for end users.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]

    We hope that github does something reasonable, but we have no control over it.


  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    We include a description of all visible changes in the NEWS file (https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/NEWS) and generally strive to keep backwards compatibility. Stable branches are maintained for older versions by distribution maintainers who backport patches for distributions (https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable). End users are not expected to update systemd directly, but depend on the distributions to do that for them.


  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    Github issues are used.


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    We include credit in the commits which fix issues. Most recently https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/743b771c559c6101544f7358a42c8c519fe4b0db. This is the most appropriate, since we don't keep a list of vulnerabilities in any other form.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]

    https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/docs/CONTRIBUTING.md#security-vulnerability-reports


  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]

    https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/CODING_STYLE


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]

    I'm not aware of such a tool.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]

    Standard meson mechanism can be used to set flags (CFLAGS=... meson, etc.).


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]

    When compiled with -g, debug information is included, we don't do anything special to remove it.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]

    Our build system (meson) resolves dependencies between subdirectories correctly.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]

    Systemd builds are repeatable according to the Repeatable Builds project.


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]

    ninja -C build install. Uninstalling systemd would result in an unbootable system, so we don't support that.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    meson/ninja uses DESTDIR.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]

    Our https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/HACKING file contains instructions how to install for testing.


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]

    All dependencies are described in the meson.build configuration files, but there is no automatic way to extract this. We also use mkosi to build CI images, and these list build dependencies, in an INI format: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/main/mkosi.conf


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]

    The project does not publish binaries or end-user artifacts, but only source code, no dependencies are part of the project's published artifacts.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]

    We don't bundle anything. Everything is provided by the installed system libraries.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    We generally support the latest versions of the compiler, all libraries, and cooperating software.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]

    A number of automatic tests are run on each PR and commit to the master branch using the github infrastructure.


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    Warning: Requires lengthier justification.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]

    Code coverage is at 72%, but this includes lots of experimental/auxiliary tools developed in the same project.

    https://coveralls.io/github/systemd/systemd?branch=main


  • New functionality testing


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]

    So far nobody bothered to do that.


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    We turn on most compiler warnings, many of them in -Werror mode.


  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]

    The project follow several security design best practices, such as resolving symlinks before use to avoid symlink swapping attacks, pinning resources (e.g.: files and directories) by file descriptor to avoid TOCTOU attacks, privileged operations are gated by industry standard practices (SELinux checks, policykit checks), and more.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    We don't implement cryptographic algorithms ourselves, but instead rely on well-established libraries like gnutls and openssl.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    We don't implement cryptographic algorithms ourselves, but instead rely on well-established libraries like gnutls and openssl.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    Passwords are stored in the kernel keyring.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    We don't implement protocol algorithms ourselves, but instead rely on well-established libraries like libmicrohttpd and programs like ssh.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    libmicrohttpd supports that, so we do to.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]

    TLS certificates are verified (both server and client).


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    We use TLS only in a very specific manner, and bidirectional verification is expected before any further communication.


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]

    No binaries are produced on release. Users consume sources from signed git tags.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    All release tags are signed, and the public keys are available to Github so that they can be displayed as verified.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]

    There are extensive checks for all input data (trusted and untrusted).


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]

    We rely on distros to provide reasonable compilation options. For example, in Fedora "-Werror=format-security -Wp,-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -Wp,-D_GLIBCXX_ASSERTIONS -fexceptions -fstack-protector-strong -grecord-gcc-switches -specs=/usr/lib/rpm/redhat/redhat-hardened-cc1 -specs=/usr/lib/rpm/redhat/redhat-annobin-cc1 -m64 -mtune=generic -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -fstack-clash-protection -fcf-protection". Users are generally not expected to compile and install the project themselves. Example build showing the hardening options: https://buildd.debian.org/status/fetch.php?pkg=systemd&arch=amd64&ver=252.6-1&stamp=1677676180&raw=0


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    Coverity does that.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    We have fuzzers for various parts of the code and they run on oss-fuzz.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek.
Entry created on 2017-11-04 18:47:58 UTC, last updated on 2025-01-11 01:08:08 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2017-11-04 19:48:26 UTC.

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