rdiff-backup

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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    Reverse differential backup tool, over a network or locally.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia LAZIMA ieleze mchakato wa uchangiaji (kwa mfano, je! Maombi ya kuvuta yanatumika?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia INAPASWA kujumuisha mahitaji ya michango inayokubalika (k.m., rejeleo la kiwango chochote kinachohitajika cha usimbaji). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]
  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The GPL-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The GPL-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/blob/master/COPYING.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs.



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    Everybody communicates in English, no challenge for us.



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]

(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]


    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    We're using Semantic Versioning supported by tags, and as requested by PyPI (among others).



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]
  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/blob/master/CHANGELOG.adoc Especially the "CHG" markers show what needs to be considered.



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    We never had a CVE but they would be documented in our changelog


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    All issues are manually tagged within a reasonable time. No issue is being ignored.



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    I initially misunderstood the requirement, each issue is being answered, even if it might take more time to implement (or reject).



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]
  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    The https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/security allows to report vulnerabilities, and the page https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/issues/new/choose offers the reporting of vulnerability issues.



    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/security creates the vulnerability reports as draft, they are by default not published.



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    Never had any vulnerability reported.


  • Working build system


    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi inahitaji ujenzi wa matumizi, mradi LAZIMA utoe mfumo wa kujenga ambao unaweza kujenga programu kiotomatiki kutoka kwa chanzo-msimbo. [build]

    INAPENDEKEZWA kuwa zana za kawaida zitumike kujenga programu. [build_common_tools]

    Mradi UNAPASWA kujengwa kwa kutumia zana za FLOSS pekee yake. [build_floss_tools]

    All dependencies are documented in https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/blob/master/bindep.txt and https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/blob/master/requirements.txt and they are all open source (in my case, pulled from Fedora, which doesn't have proprietary software in their repos).


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    All tests can be called using tox -c tox***.ini (we have multiple tox files)



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    The standard tests has a coverage validation and no code can be merged without passing this test.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    There is a pipeline https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/tree/master/.github/workflows and no code can be merged without all tests passing.


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    The standard tests has a coverage validation and no code can be merged without passing this test.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    Just added a new PR to cover this aspect: https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/pull/759


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    We're using flake8 to check all our code.



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    I hesitate between Met and N/A but I agree, warnings obfuscate the real issues and must be avoided. I think we're strict enough about this.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    I don't think that the concept of warnings really applies to Python code.


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie, kwa chaguo-msingi, tu itifaki za kriptografia na mifumbo ambazo zimechapishwa hadharani na kukaguliwa na wataalam (ikiwa itifaki za kriptografia na mafumbo imetumika). [crypto_published]

    We're not developing any cryptographic algorithm, only using existing/free libraries.



    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ni programu au maktaba, na kusudi lake la msingi sio kutekeleza usimbuaji, basi INAPASWA tu kuita programu iliyoundwa kihususa kutekeleza kazi za kielelezo; HAIPASWI kutekeleza-upya shughuli hiyo. [crypto_call]

    We're using mainly SSH.



    Utendaji wote katika programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ambayo inategemea usimbuaji LAZIMA iweze kutekelezwa kwa kutumia FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    Everything is FLOSS in our toolchain.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie kwa msingi keylengths ambazo angalau zinakidhi mahitaji ya chini ya NIST kufikia mwaka wa 2030 (kama ilivyoelezwa mnamo 2012). LAZIMA iwe rahisi kusanidi programu ili keylengths ndogo zimezimwa kabisa. [crypto_keylength]

    We're using whatever SSH considers acceptable, we don't define our own policy.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    We're using SHA1 to create checksums for the files in our backup repository. I think, this is acceptable because this isn't to be considered as a security feature but rather against file system corruption and the like. Nevertheless we're considering moving to a more modern hash algorithm, but this needs careful consideration as it will break backward compatibility for repositories which some users keep for years. Follow https://github.com/rdiff-backup/rdiff-backup/issues/960



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    We're using whatever SSH considers acceptable, we don't define our own policy.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi INAPASWA kutekeleza kwa ukamilifu usiri wa umbele ya itifaki za makubaliano ya funguo ili funguo la kipindi kilicho tokana na kikao cha vifungo muda-mrefu haziwezi kuridhi mabaya ikiwa mojawapo ya vifunguo vya muda-mrefu imeridhi mabaya katika usoni. [crypto_pfs]

    We're using whatever SSH considers acceptable, we don't define our own policy.



    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi imesababisha uhifadhi wa nywila kwa minajili ya uthibitishaji ya watumiaji wa kutoka nje, nywila LAZIMA zihifadhiwe kwa mficho uliorudiarudia na chumvi kwa kila-mtumiaji kwa kutumia kanuni ya upanuaji (rudiarudia) wa funguo (k.m., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). Ona pia Kurasadogo ya Uhifadhi wa Nywila la OWASP). [crypto_password_storage]

    We're using whatever SSH considers acceptable, we don't define our own policy.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itoe funguo zote za kriptologia na nonces kwa kutumia kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati kuptia kriptologia salama, na ISIWEZE kufanya hivo kutumia vitengenezi zisizo salama kikriptologia. [crypto_random]

    We're using whatever SSH considers acceptable, we don't define our own policy.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    GitHub and PyPI standard approach.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    GitHub and PyPI standard approach.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]


    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    flake8 and black are used and any PR must pass the tests.



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    We have added bandit to our static analysis tools.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    As bandit is part of the PR pipeline at medium level, no such issue can go by without getting fixed before the merge.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    flake8, black and bandit are used and any PR must pass the tests before anything can be committed to master branch.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]


    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    Assuming this doesn't apply to the little glue code we have in C to bind the librsync C-library



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]


    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    We don't do dynamic analysis so there is nothing to fix.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Eric L. and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Eric L..
Entry created on 2022-05-25 04:46:45 UTC, last updated on 2024-01-28 06:01:01 UTC.

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